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Abstract—Coded caching is a technique where we utilize
multi-casting opportunities to reduce rate in cached net-
works. One limitation of coded caching schemes is that they
reveal the demands of all users to their peers. In this work,
we consider coded caching schemes that assure privacy
for user demands with a particular focus on reducing
subpacketization. For the 2-user, 2-file case, we present
a new linear demand-private scheme with the lowest
possible subpacketization. This is done by presenting the
scheme explicitly and proving impossibility results under
lower subpacketization. Additionally, when only partial
privacy is required, we show that subpacketization can be
significantly reduced when there are a large number of
files.
I. INTRODUCTION
Data traffic has been growing rapidly in recent years
with content delivery, especially that of multimedia files,
contributing a significant part. One important aspect
of such traffic is its temporal variation. Network us-
age during peak demand times could be much higher
than the demand in off-peak hours. Caching is a way
to alleviate network congestion during peak hours by
prefetching popular content nearer to the user during off-
peak hours. Depending on the limitations on memory,
a part of these files would be prefetched and once the
user makes a demand, the rest of the requested file
will be transmitted. Early literature on caching focused
on cache placement/replacement policies [1], caching
architectures [3], [14], [16], web request models [2] etc.
Maddah-Ali and Niesen had shown in their seminal
paper that coding can achieve significant gain over
uncoded caching by making use of multicast opportu-
nities [12]. Coded caching achieves an additional global
caching gain, which is proportional to the number of
users. Their scheme is shown to be order optimal with
an information-theoretic lower bound on the number of
files needed to be transmitted (known as rate). Though
the exact lower bound on peak rate is still an open
problem several works had investigated this and came
up with tighter bounds [7], [19], [26], [29]. The problem
has been studied in several settings like decentralized
caching [13], non-uniform demands [15], multiple levels
of cache [10] to name a few. Most of the schemes
in these works involve storing the prefetched parts of
files in uncoded form. Coded prefetching is investigated
in [4], [8], [24], where linear combinations of subfiles
are stored in caches. In a few regimes this approach
can improve the rate-memory trade-off over uncoded
prefetching.
Yan et al. developed a structure called placement
delivery arrays that could model both the placement and
delivery schemes in a single array [27]. Graphical models
for caching have been investigated in [20], [22], [28].
Schemes can also be derived using combinatorial designs
and linear block codes [23]. A limitation with the origi-
nal centralized scheme was the high subpacketization of
files [21]. In the original scheme due to [12], the number
of subfiles a file is split into, increases exponentially
with the number of users. These combinatorial models
have helped in developing schemes that have lower
subpacketization but with a small penalty on rate [5],
[22].
One area of particular interest is security and privacy
in coded caching. In typical coded caching schemes,
other users involved in the multicast or eavesdroppers
might get to know the identity of the file a particular
user demanded and its contents. Furthermore, users will
be able to partially access files which they have not
demanded. This is in part due to the cache that contains
contents of files not requested by them and also because,
during delivery, they may be able to decode packets
not meant for them. Sengupta et al. [18] proposed a
method for preventing information leakage to an external
wiretapper with the use of cryptographic keys. Visakh et
al. [17] had recently shown that the contents of a file
could be revealed only to the user/users who requested
it, using secret sharing techniques.
One aspect that has not been investigated much is
the privacy of the user requests in the specific con-
text of coded caching, while it has been studied in
closely related areas like index coding [11] and private
information retrieval (PIR) [6]. As we were preparing
this manuscript, we became aware of work due to Wan
and Caire [25] who take a different approach for user
request privacy from ours. Another paper by Kamath [9]
also addressed the problem of demand privacy and their
approach is similar to the one in this work. We point out
the specific differences in our results when compared to
those from [25] and [9] below.
In this work, we explore methods to obtain privacy
of each user’s requests from the other users in coded
caching keeping subpacketization constraints as an im-
portant parameter.
Our specific contributions are as follows:
i) We focus on the 2-user, 2-file case in detail and
provide an achievable multicast transmission rate
versus cache storage curve under a demand privacy
constraint.
ii) For the 2-user, 2-file case with cache storage of
1 file, we show an explicit demand-private scheme
achieving a multicast transmission rate of 2/3 with
a subpacketization of 3. This scheme cannot be
obtained using the general scheme proposed in [9],
which, in fact, requires a subpacketization of 6.
iii) For the 2-user, 2-file case, we prove some impossi-
bility results on subpacketization of 2 and uncoded
cache storage for linear coded caching with demand
privacy. These are some of the first negative results
in this new area.
iv) Finally, we propose a general K-user, N -file par-
tially demand-private scheme that provides a trade-
off between the level of privacy and reduction in
subpacketization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we describe the system setup and the problem
statement. In Section III, we provide demand-private
schemes and an achievable rate vs cache memory curve
for the case of two users and two files. We prove certain
impossibility results with respect to packetization and
coded prefetching. In Section IV, we describe the general
scheme for constructing demand-private coded caching
schemes from non-private coded caching schemes from
[9], and provide specific instances of the construction
from PDAs resulting in lesser subpacketization. We also
introduce the notion of partially private schemes and
show how to construct a partially private scheme. We
conclude with a brief discussion on scope for future work
in Section V.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. System setup
Assume that we have a server with N files. Each file
is assumed to be of F bits and the i-th file is denoted
Wi. The server is connected to K users via a multicast
link. Each user has a cache of size MF bits. The cache
contents of the i-th user are denoted Zi. The system
setup is shown in Fig. 1. The cache system works in
Z1Z0 ZK´1
XD
Server
W0
W1
...
WN´1
. . .
Fig. 1. Caching system.
two phases. In the first phase called the placement phase,
the cache of each user is populated with content by the
server. In addition, the server sends metadata or header
information ΘpZiq about how the cache content was
derived from the files to User i. The header information
is assumed to be small in size when compared to the file
size but crucial for decoding purposes. Note that during
the placement phase the server is unaware of the files
demanded by the users. We assume that the transmission
of cache content and header takes place over a private
link between the server and each user.
In the second phase, called the delivery phase, each
user requests the server for one of the files from the set
of N files. The demand of the i-th user is denoted Di,
where Di P rN s fi t0, 1, . . . , N ´ 1u. The demands of
all the users 0 to K´1 is denoted by the demand vector
D “ pD0, D1, . . . , DK´1q. We assume that the Di are
all i.i.d. random variables uniformly distributed over
rN s and that the demands are sent over a private link
between the user and the server. Based on the demands,
the server multicasts ℓ packets, typically of the same
size. The entire multicast transmission from the server
is denoted XD for a demand vector D. It consists of
RF bits. The transmission XD depends on the cache
Zi and the demands Di. The quantity R is called the
rate of transmission. In addition to XD, some additional
metadata or header information about the transmission
is typically multicast in coded caching schemes. This
metadata, denoted ΘpXDq, is usually small compared
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to the file size and provides critical information for
decoding by the users.
The main requirement in a coded caching scheme is
that User i should be able to decode the file WDi using
Zi, ΘpZiq, X
D and ΘpXDq. In other words, we require
HpWDi | Zi,ΘpZiq, X
D,ΘpXDqq “ 0. (1)
We denote a coded caching scheme with K users, N
files, local cache size M , and rate R as a pK,N ;M,Rq
coded caching scheme, or as a pK,Nq scheme in short.
B. Demand privacy in coded caching
We will introduce the notion of demand privacy in
coded caching with a simple example. Consider the
p2, 2q coded caching scheme due to Maddah-Ali and
Niesen [12] shown in Fig. 2.
A
B
A0, B0
Z0
A1, B1
Z1
XD
D0D1 X
AA A1 ‘A0
AB A1 ‘B0
BA B1 ‘A0
BB B1 ‘B0
Fig. 2. Non-private scheme from [12] fo r N “ 2 files, K “ 2 users
and demand vector, D “ pD1,D2q.
Suppose that the demand is pA,Aq. This results in
the transmission A1 ‘ A0. To recover the files, each
user must know what linear combination of subfiles has
been transmitted. So, we will suppose that the server
sends the linear combination information as header along
with the transmission. It is easy to see that each user
can recover the missing portion of the file demanded
by them. However, the scheme has the unfortunate side
effect of revealing the demands of each user to the other
parties. From the header and scheme details, it is clear to
User 0 that User 1 demanded the file A and vice versa.
If the transmission is Ai ‘ Bj , then the i-th user
can infer that the j-th user has requested A based on
the linear combination header information. In general,
users can use the combined information of their cache,
demands and header data from the server to learn about
another user’s demands.
Based on the preceding discussion, to achieve demand
privacy in a coded caching scheme, we impose the
following additional condition for all demand vectors D:
IpDi, Zi,ΘpZiq, X
D,ΘpXDq;Djq “ 0, i ‰ j. (2)
In other words, we require that the i-th user is completely
uncertain about what the j-th user demands, given all
information available to User i in the coded caching
scheme. It can be shown that the standard Maddah-Ali-
Niesen scheme [12] does not satisfy the demand privacy
condition in Eq. (2).
III. pK “ 2, N “ 2q CODED CACHING WITH DEMAND
PRIVACY
We will first consider the case when there are two files
and two users. A complete characterization of the M vs
R region in the case of two files/users was one of the
starting points of the area of coded caching. Therefore,
it is important to fully characterize the same region with
demand privacy. We have made some partial progress
towards this problem.
First, we will show the design of a linear p2, 2; 1, 2{3q
coded caching scheme with demand privacy having a
subpacketization (number of parts into which each file is
divided) of 3. In comparison, directly converting a p4, 2q-
Maddah-Ali-Niesen scheme into a p2, 2; 1, 2{3q demand-
private scheme requires a subpacketization of 6 [9].
A. pM “ 1, R “ 2{3q scheme with subpacketization 3
The two files, A and B, are divided into 3 parts Ai,
i “ 0, 1, 2 and Bi, i “ 0, 1, 2. Table I summarizes the
entire scheme.
TABLE I
pK “ 2, N “ 2;M “ 1, R “ 2{3q DEMAND-PRIVATE CACHING
SCHEME WITH SUBPACKETIZATION 3. IF SERVER ASSIGNS THE
CACHE Zi0 TO USER i, THEN X
D0D1 IS THE TRANSMISSION FOR
THE DEMAND D0D1 .
Notation
Possible
cache
contents
Z00
A0 ‘A1
B0 ‘B1
A2 ‘B1
Z01
A0 ‘A1
B0 ‘B1
A1 ‘B2
Z10
A0 ‘A2
B0 ‘B2
A1 ‘B2
Z11
A0 ‘A2
B0 ‘B2
A2 ‘B1
D0D1 X
D0D1
AA
A0
B0
AB
A1
B1
BA
A2
B2
BB
A0 ‘ A1 ‘ A2
B0 ‘ B1 ‘ B2
In the placement phase, the server places either Zi0 or
Zi1, with equal probability, as the cache Zi for User i.
The actual choice is private between the server and
User i. If User i was assigned the cache Zi0, then
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TABLE II
FILES RECOVERED FROM POSSIBLE CACHE PAIRS AND
TRANSMISSIONX FOR THE SCHEME FROM TABLE I
Caches
Z0,Z1
X A0
B0
A1
B1
A2
B2
A0 ‘A1 ‘A2
B0 ‘B1 ‘B2
Z00,Z10 A,A A,B B,A B,B
Z00,Z11 A,B A,A B,B B,A
Z01,Z11 B,B B,A A,B A,A
Z01,Z10 B,A B,B A,A A,B
the multicast transmissions XD0D1 for each possible
demand pD0, D1q are as shown in Table I. It can be seen
that all the demands are served. It can also be checked
that the demands are private under this assignment. For
instance, from Table II, we see that there exists another
assignment of cache for each user which recovers an-
other file with the same transmission.
Table III is the set of recoverable files under each
possible cache content for a given transmission. For the
TABLE III
FILES RECOVERED FROM POSSIBLE CACHES FOR A p2, 2; 1, 2{3q
PRIVATE SCHEME.
XAB XBA XBB XAA
Z00 A B B A
Z01 B A A B
Z10 B A B A
Z11 A B A B
same transmission, each user is able to recover either
file A or file B with the two possible cache contents.
Since the actual cache content is private, we readily see
that this scheme satisfies the demand privacy condition
in Eq. (2).
B. Dual private schemes
We show that a p2, 2;M “ M1, R “ R1q scheme
with demand privacy can be converted into a p2, 2;M “
R1, R “M1q demand-private scheme and this results in
symmetric R vs M capacity bounds for the p2, 2q case.
One can observe that the roles of caches and transmis-
sions can be interchanged in the symmetric file recovery
matrix in Table III. Hence, from the scheme given in
Table I, we can arrive at a scheme given in Table IV
with rate R “ 1 for M “ 2{3. We call this scheme the
dual of the original scheme.
Our next result generalizes the above for all p2, 2q
private schemes that use one of two caches uniformly at
random.
Lemma 1 (Duality of transmissions and caches). Sup-
pose that there exists a p2, 2;M “M1, R “ R1q private
scheme where the server places one of two possible
TABLE IV
DUAL PRIVATE p2, 2; 2{3, 1q SCHEME FROM THE PRIVATE
p2, 2; 1, 2{3q SCHEME GIVEN IN TABLE I. FOR CACHE Zi0 AT
USER i, XD0D1 IS THE TRANSMISSION FOR THE DEMAND D0D1 .
Notation
Possible Cache
Contents
Z00
A1
B1
Z01
A2
B2
Z10
A0 ‘ A1 ‘ A2
B0 ‘ B1 ‘ B2
Z11
A0
B0
D1D2 X
D0D1
AA
A0 ‘A2
B0 ‘B2
A2 ‘ B1
AB
A0 ‘A1
B0 ‘B1
A2 ‘ B1
BA
A0 ‘A1
B0 ‘B1
A1 ‘ B2
BB
A0 ‘A2
B0 ‘B2
A1 ‘ B2
cache contents uniformly at random. Then, there exists
a p2, 2;M “ R1, R “M1q private scheme.
Proof. Consider a p2, 2;M,Rq private scheme con-
structed with users having two options to populate their
caches. Let tZ00, Z01u be the set of two cache options
for User 0 and tZ10, Z11u be the set of two cache
options for User 1. Let XD1D2 be the transmission
corresponding to the user demands D “ pD1, D2q and
cache Zi0 at User i. The sets Z “ tZ00, Z01, Z10, Z11u
and X “ tXAA, XAB, XBA, XBBu are able to recover
files A and B as given in Table III. Let the size of Zi
be R1F bits and that of X
W0W1 be M1F bits. We can
interchange the role of these caches and transmissions.
Let tXAB, XBAu be the set of two cache options for
User 0 and tXBB, XAAu be the set of two cache options
for User 1. Then if Z11 is transmitted and the Users 0
and 1 are assigned tXABu and tXBBu as their caches,
both can recover file A. Instead if User 1 had XBA
in its cache, the users would have recovered B and
A, respectively. This way of interchangeability between
caches and transmissions gives rise to a new scheme for
2 users and 2 files, where the cache size is M1 bits and
transmission size is R1 bits.
A consequence of the above duality is that the achiev-
able trade-off between memory and rate for p2, 2q private
schemes is symmetric about the line M “ R.
Lemma 2 (Time sharing with file splitting). Given two
achievable pM,Rq pairs for a p2, 2q private scheme, all
values of pM,Rq along the line joining these points are
achievable.
Proof. Consider 0 ď α ď 1. Split the file A into
two parts Aα and Aα¯ of size αF bits and p1 ´ αqF
4
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1 2
2
3
1
2
M
R
Fig. 3. Achievable pM,Rq region for p2, 2;M,Rq private schemes.
The p2, 2; 1, 2{3q scheme and its dual scheme p2, 2; 1, 2{3q have
a subpacketization of three subfiles. The straight lines are due to
Lemma 2. For these schemes, the subpacketization need not be three.
bits respectively. Similarly, split B into Bα and Bα¯.
Denote the two achievable private caching schemes as
p2, 2;M,Rq and p2, 2;M 1, R1q respectively. We can use
the p2, 2;M,Rq scheme for sharing Aα and Bα and
the p2, 2;M 1, R1q scheme for sharing Aα¯, and Bα¯.
The overall scheme shares A and B with effective
cache size pαM ` p1 ´ αqM 1qF bits and transmission
pαR ` p1 ´ αqR1qF bits giving a p2, 2;αM ` p1 ´
αqM 1, αR` p1´ αqR1q private scheme.
Note that the time sharing scheme in Lemma 2 has
a subpacketization that is equal to the sum of the
two schemes used for time sharing. Using Lemma 2,
and Lemma 1 we can plot the upper bounds for the
achievable pM,Rq pair for p2, 2q private schemes. The
plot is symmetric about the line M “ R as can be seen
in Fig. 3
C. Towards lower bounds and optimal subpacketization
In the non-private case, the M vs R region is fully
characterized for two users and two files. For the case
with demand privacy, it is not clear whether any of the
points in the achievable M vs R curve shown in Fig. 3
are optimal, or if the subpacketizations are optimal.
While we do not have lower bounds and optimality
results yet, we present a few basic impossibility results
involving subpacketization and coding of cache contents.
In the non-private case for two users/files, subpacketi-
zation of 2 suffices to result in optimal rate of R “ 1{2
for M “ 1. For the private case, we have the following
result.
Lemma 3. Consider N “ 2, K “ 2 with subpacketiza-
tion of 2 andM “ 1. A rate R “ 1{2 cannot be achieved
with demand privacy when using a linear scheme.
Proof. A proof is given in Appendix A.
For subpacketization of 3, the scheme in Section III-A
uses coded cache contents, which is not typical in the
non-private setting. In the setting considered here for
demand privacy, we have the following result on coding
in cache contents.
Lemma 4. Consider N “ 2, K “ 2 with subpacketi-
zation of 3 and M “ 1. If the cache contents are not
allowed to be coded (i.e. linear combinations of two or
more file parts are not allowed to be stored in cache), a
rate R “ 2{3 cannot be achieved with demand privacy
when using a linear scheme.
Proof. A proof is given in Appendix B.
IV. GENERAL SCHEME AND PARTIAL PRIVACY
In this section, we describe the general scheme from
[9] that provides the design of a demand-private coded
caching scheme from non-private schemes.
Theorem 5 (Existence of private schemes [9]). If there
exists a pKN,N ;M,Rq coded caching scheme, then
there exists a private pK,N ;M,Rq scheme.
Proof. Assume that we have a pKN,N ;M,Rq non-
private scheme. Let the cache contents of each of the
users be given as Z 1i, where 0 ď i ă NK .
Partition the users into sets of size N . Without loss of
generality we partition the NK users as
Uk “ tpk ´ 1qN ď j ă kNu. (3)
Denote the cache of the kth user of the private scheme
as Zk. This is chosen as follows:
Zk “ Z
1
pk´1qN`rk
(4)
where rk is uniformly distributed on t0, 1, . . . , N ´ 1u.
During delivery the server receives the demand vector
pd0, . . . , dK´1q. The server then generates the transmis-
sion corresponding to the demand vector of the non-
private scheme. This demand vector is of length NK
and denoted D1 “ pd1jq. We can assign any random
permutation of the demands rN s to the users in Uk
subject to the condition that d1
rk`pk´1qN
“ dk. Formally,
πk : Uk Ñ rN s (5a)
d1j “ πkpjq (5b)
d1rk`pk´1qN “ πkprk ` pk ´ 1qNq “ dk (5c)
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Denote the demand vector of the non-private
pKN,Nq scheme as D1 “ pd1jqjPrNKs Since the non-
private scheme can accommodate all demands, it can
also serve this demand. Transmit XD
1
as per the non-
private scheme. Then each user of the private scheme is
able to receive the file requested.
Demand privacy can be shown as follows. The i-th
user of the private scheme is able to recover the file he
or she requested. The same transmission can be used to
recover all the files by the caches Z 1pj´1qK , . . . , Z
1
jK´1.
However, the i-th user does not know which of these
caches has been assigned to the j-th user. Since all of
them are equally likely to be assigned to j-th user by
construction, the uncertainty about the demandDj given
Di, X, Zi is HpDjq. Thus, the privacy of demands is
preserved.
Observe that the cache size of users in the private
scheme is same as the size of the cache in the non-private
scheme. Similarly, the rate of transmission for the private
scheme is exactly the same as that of the non-private
scheme. From this it follows the demand private scheme
has the parameters pK,N ;M,Rq as claimed.
Remark (Extended demand vector). While creating the
extended demand vectorD1 we can make a simple choice
for πk. The demand of the jth user of the non-private
scheme is given as
d1j “ dk ´ rk ` j mod N for pk ´ 1qN ď j ă kN, (6)
where 0 ď k ă K .
A. Constructions using Maddah-Ali-Niesen schemes and
PDAs
Using the Maddah-Ali-Niesen scheme [12] as the non-
private scheme in Theorem 5, we obtain the following:
Corollary 6. There exists a demand private
pK,N ;M,Rq scheme for integer values of KM ,
where the rate
R “
#
KpN´Mq
p1`KMq if M ě
K´1
K
N ´M if M ă K´1
K
. (7)
Proof. This follows from Theorem 5 using the scheme
proposed by Maddah Ali and Niesen [12, Theorem 1].
In this case, for integer values of KM we can construct
a pNK,N ;M,Rq non-private scheme. If KM ě K´1,
then R “ KpN´Mqp1`KMq . If 1 ď KM ă K ´ 1, then R “
N ´M . We can map each user to a user in the non-
private scheme using Eq. (4) and extend the demand
vector of the private pK,N ;M,Rq scheme to the non-
private scheme using Eq. (6). Then the scheme from [12]
gives the cache contents that should be stored in each
user and a transmission for each demand from which
each user can recover their files. The cache memory and
rate required in the private scheme will be the same as
that in the non-private scheme.
Note that there is no coding gain when KM ă K´1.
A general framework for non-private coded caching
schemes was proposed in [27] using placement delivery
arrays (PDAs). We can convert many of these schemes to
private coded caching schemes. Some of them improve
upon those derived from schemes [12] in subpacketiza-
tion or other parameters. For positive integers K , f , Z
and S, a pK, f, Z, Sq placement delivery array is a fˆK
matrix pP “ rpj,ks with j P rF s, k P rKsq containing
either a “˚” or integers from t0, 1, . . . , S ´ 1u in each
cell such that they satisfy a few conditions [27]. Here,
f is the subpacketization, and S is the total number of
transmissions each of size 1{f of the file. For any N ,
we can obtain a pK,N ; NZ
f
, S
f
q coded caching scheme
from a pK, f, Z, Sq placement delivery array.
Corollary 7 (Private schemes from PDAs). If there exists
a pNK, f, Z, Sq placement delivery array, we can obtain
a private pK,N ; NZ
f
, S
f
q coded caching scheme, for any
N .
Proof. Given a pNK, f, Z, Sq placement delivery ar-
ray, there exists a non-private pNK,N ; NZ
f
, S
f
q (see
[27] for details). From this we can obtain the private
pK,N ; NZ
f
, S
f
q scheme using Theorem 5.
We now present an example of a private scheme with
N “ 2, K “ 3, derived from a PDA. Consider the
PDA from [27, Eq. (7)] corresponding to 6 users and 4
subfiles.
P “
»
——–
˚ 1 ˚ 2 ˚ 0
0 ˚ ˚ 3 1 ˚
˚ 3 0 ˚ 2 ˚
2 ˚ 1 ˚ ˚ 3
fi
ffiffifl (8)
We assume that each fileWi is split into f subfiles which
are denoted as Wi,j , where 0 ď j ă f . In the non-
private scheme, the cache contents of the i-th user are
given below.
Z 1
0
“ tWi,0,Wi,2 : i P r0, 6qu
Z 11 “ tWi,1,Wi,3 : i P r0, 6qu
Z 1
2
“ tWi,0,Wi,1 : i P r0, 6qu
Z 13 “ tWi,2,Wi,3 : i P r0, 6qu
Z 1
4
“ tWi,0,Wi,3 : i P r0, 6qu
Z 15 “ tWi,1,Wi,2 : i P r0, 6qu
6
The transmission for demand vector d
1 “ pd10, . . . , d
1
5q
is
Xd
1
“
$’’&
’’%
Wd1
0
,1 ‘Wd1
2
,2 ‘Wd1
5
,0
Wd1
1
,0 ‘Wd1
2
,3 ‘Wd1
4
,1
Wd1
0
,3 ‘Wd1
3
,0 ‘Wd1
4
,2
Wd1
1
,2 ‘Wd1
3
,1 ‘Wd1
5
,3
,//.
//- . (9)
For N “ 2 files, A and B, we can create a private (3,
2; 1, 1) scheme as shown in Fig. 4.
A
B
A2, A3,
B2, B3
Z10
A1, A3,
B1, B3
Z00
A0, A2,
B0, B2
Z01
A0, A1,
B0, B1
Z11
A1, A2,
B1, B2
Z20
A0, A3,
B0, B3
Z21
B1‘A2‘A0,
A0‘A3‘B1,
B3‘B0‘B2,
A2‘B1‘A3,
User 0 User 1 User 2
Fig. 4. A p3, 2; 1, 1q private scheme for D “ pA,A,Bq from a
p6, 2; 1, 1q non-private scheme from the PDA given in (8).
B. Case of two files, two users
For the N “ 2, K “ 2 case considered earlier, the
M “ 1, R “ 2{3 construction presented in Section III-A
is not derived from a non-private scheme but constructed
directly. In fact, a construction from the Maddah-Ali-
Niesen scheme using Theorem 5 results in a subpacke-
tization of 6, when compared to the subpacketization of
3 needed for the scheme in Section III-A. This shows
that direct construction has the benefits of improved
subpacketization.
C. Partial privacy and reduction in subpacketization
The scheme modified from the non-private scheme can
have less subpacketization if full privacy is not needed.
For instance, suppose that 2-file privacy suffices. That is,
at the end of the multicast transmission, every user has
an ambiguity of one of two files about any other user’s
demand.
For 2-file privacy, we need to provide only two options
to populate the cache content of a user. Hence, we
can use a p2N,Kq non-private scheme to arrive at
an pN,Kq partially private scheme where any user’s
demand is possibly one of two files to another user.
These schemes are important particularly when we have
large number of files compared to users. For example,
if N “ 10 and K “ 2, then a fully private scheme
modified from the non-private scheme would require the
non-private scheme to have K 1 “ NK “ 20. With
M “ 5, such a scheme would require a subpacketization
f “
`
K1
K1M
N
˘
“
`
20
10
˘
“ 184756. But under 2-file privacy
for this setup, K 1 “ 2K “ 4, and we can use a
subpacketization as low as f “
`
4
2
˘
“ 6. In Fig. 5,
we show a partially private p2, 4; 2, 2{3q scheme from a
p4, 4; 2, 2{3q non-private scheme providing an ambiguity
of two files.
A
B
C
D
A01, A12,
A13, B01,
B12, B13,
C01, C12,
C13, D01,
D12, D13
Z01
A01, A02,
A03, B01,
B02, B03,
C01, C02,
C03, D01,
D02, D03
Z00
A02, A12,
A23, B02,
B12, B23,
C02, C12,
C23, D02,
D12, D23
Z10
A03, A13,
A23, B03,
B13, B23,
C03, C13,
C23, D03,
D13, D23
Z11
D12 ‘ B02 ‘ D01,
D13 ‘ B03 ‘ C01,
D23 ‘ D03 ‘ C02,
B23 ‘D13 ‘ C12
User 0 User 1
Fig. 5. A p2, 4; 2, 2{3q partially private scheme from a p4, 4; 2, 2{3q
non-private scheme. The scheme has a privacy of two files. The gray
boxes show the cache assigned by the server. The demands correspond-
ing to unassigned caches for User k are selected at random from the
set tWj,jPrNsuzDk . Transmission shown is for the demand vector
D “ tB,Du and the extended demand vector D “ tD,B,D,Cu.
Observe that cache contents Z00, Z01, Z10, Z11 recover the files D,
B, D, C, respectively. From the point of view of the User 1, the User 0
could have requested either D or B giving the necessary privacy.
V. CONCLUSION
We have investigated here the problem of demand
privacy in systems employing coded caching techniques
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with a focus on minimizing subpacketization. For the 2-
user, 2-file case, we provided a new construction with a
subpacketization of 3. Additionally, we proved that the
subpacketization of 3 is indeed minimal for a linear code
for the 2-user, 2-file case. Also, we proposed partially
private caching schemes and showed how to construct
such private schemes with less subpacketization in the
general K-user, N -file case.
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APPENDIX A
IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS FOR p2, 2q PRIVATE LINEAR
SCHEMES WITH TWO SUBFILES
A coded caching scheme is said to be linear if all the
cache contents, transmissions and the decoding involves
only linear operations. Here we provide a proof for
Lemma 3 in Section III and show that there does not
exist a private p2, 2; 1, 0.5q linear coded caching scheme
with subpacketization of two. The proof method is by
contradiction. So, we begin by assuming the existence
of a p2, 2; 1, 0.5q linear coded caching scheme with
subpacketization of two.
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A. Notation and setup
Suppose A,B are split into two subfiles each as
A0, A1 and B0, B1, respectively. Let S be defined as
S “
»
——–
A0
A1
B0
B1
fi
ffiffifl . (10)
Let the i-th user’s cache Zi and the transmission X
D1D2
be written as
Zi “ CiS, (11)
XD1D2 “ TD1D2S, (12)
where Ci and T
D1D2 are 2 ˆ 4 and 1 ˆ 4 coefficient
matrices, respectively, with entries from a suitable field.
User i can decode Di given T
D1D2 using the cache Zi.
The matrix Ci is split into 2ˆ2 matrices CiA and CiB
as follows:
Ci “
“
CiA CiB
‰
, (13)
Similarly, TD1D2 is split into two 1 ˆ 2 submatrices as
shown below.
TD1D2 “
“
TD1D2A T
D1D2
B
‰
. (14)
We denote the rank of a matrix Q by rkpQq.
We assume that
rkpCiq “ 2 (15)
implying that each cache contains independent subfile
combinations.
B. Lemmas on structure of coefficient matrices
Lemma 8 (Rank constraints on coefficient matrices).
rkpCiAq “ rkpCiBq “ 1.
Proof. We will show rkpC0Bq “ 1. Consider the 3 ˆ 4
matrix
M0AB “
„
C0A C0B
TABA T
AB
B

. (16)
The cache of User 0 and transmission for the demand
AB, when combined, result in the vectorM0ABS. Since
User 0 can recover A “ rA0 A1s by linearly combining
the elements of M0ABS, there exists a 2 ˆ 3 matrix U
such that
U
„
C0A
TABA

“
„
1 0
0 1

, (17)
and
U
„
C0B
TABB

“
„
0 0
0 0

, (18)
resulting in the decoding of A and elimination of B0
and B1. From Eq. (17), the rank of U is 2. Using this
in Eq. (18), rkpC0Bq ‰ 2.
If C0B is the all-zero matrix, then User 0 can-
not recover B using only the transmission XBA. So,
rkpC0Bq ‰ 0. This only leaves the possibility rkpC0Bq “
1. The proof above can be readily adapted to show
rkpCiAq “ 1 for i “ 0, 1 and rkpC1Bq “ 1.
A consequence of Lemma 8, none of the files are
stored entirely on any cache.
For an invertible 2ˆ2 matrix U , the scheme obtained
by replacing Ci by UCi is also a demand-private coded
caching scheme because one cache can be obtained from
the other. This is captured in the following lemma for
future use.
Lemma 9 (Equivalent coefficient matrices). Cache Zi “
CiS can recover file W from a transmission X iff
Z 1i “ UCiS can recover the same file from X for any
invertible 2ˆ 2 matrix U .
Corollary 10 (Reduced coefficient matrices). Given the
coefficient matrix Ci, there exist invertible matrices Ui
and Vi such that
ViUiCi “
„
a b 0 0
0 0 c d

, (19)
where both pa, bq and pc, dq are nonzero.
Proof. Suppose that Ci is written as follows.
Ci “
„
a b ˚ ˚
a1 b1 ˚ ˚

. (20)
By Lemma 8, rkpCiAq “ 1. Hence, without loss of
generality we can assume that pa, bq ‰ p0, 0q, and pa1, b1q
is a scalar multiple of pa, bq. There exists some invertible
matrix Ui “
„
1 0
α 1

for some scalar α such that
UiCi “
„
a b c1 d1
0 0 c d

(21)
for some c, d, c1 and d1. Since rkpCiq “ 2, it follows that
pc, dq ‰ p0, 0q. Then for some β and Vi “
„
1 β
0 1

we obtain Eq. (19).
An immediate consequence of Lemma 9 and Corol-
lary 10, we can assume that the coefficient matrices are
of the form given below.
Ci “
„
ai bi 0 0
0 0 ci di

. (22)
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Lemma 11 (Constraints due to recovery). Given TD0D1
and Ci, we have the following constraints.
rk
˜«
CiDi
TD0D1Di
ff¸
“ 2 (23a)
rk
˜«
CiDi
TD0D1
Di
ff¸
“ 1, (23b)
where Di P tA,Bu and Di “ tA,BuzDi is the file that
is not demanded by User i.
Proof. Consider the coefficient matrix Ci of User i, has
an equivalent form given in Eq. (22). Combining with
TD0D1 we have
„
Ci
TD0D1

S “
»
– ai bi 0 00 0 ci di
TD0D1A T
D0D1
B
fi
fl
»
——–
A0
A1
B0
B1
fi
ffiffifl . (24)
From this system of equations, one can observe that A0
and A1 appear in two equations. If Di “ A, then User i
must recover the subfiles A0 and A1, and the following
condition must hold.
rk
ˆ„
ai bi
TD0D1A
˙
“ 2 (25)
Similarly if Di “ B, the following condition must hold
for User i to recover file B from TD0D1 .
rk
ˆ„
ci di
TD0D1B
˙
“ 2. (26)
Eq. (23a) follows from Eq. (25) and Eq. (26).
One can see that the condition in Eq. (25) is not
enough for recovering Di “ A at User i using Eq. (24).
We should be able to remove the part corresponding
to TD0D1
Di
“ TD0D1B from the third row in Eq. (24) to
arrive at two equations in two variables A0, A1 and solve
for them. So if TD0D1B is nonzero, then it should be a
scalar multiple of pci, diq. Since pci, diq is nonzero from
Lemma 8, we have
rk
ˆ„
ci di
TD0D1B
˙
“ 1 (27)
Hence
rk
ˆ„
C0B
TAD1B
˙
“ 1 and rk
ˆ„
C1B
TD0AB
˙
“ 1. (28)
Similarly solving for B0 and B1 (i.e. Di “ B) at User i
requires
rk
ˆ„
ai bi
TD0D1A
˙
“ 1 (29)
Hence
rk
ˆ„
C0A
TBD1A
˙
“ 1 and rk
ˆ„
C1A
TD0BA
˙
“ 1. (30)
Eq. (28) and Eq. (30) immediately imply Eq. (23b).
So far, we have not used the requirement of demand
privacy. The following lemma uses the demand privacy
condition to derive an important constraint on the trans-
mission.
Lemma 12 (Constraints on transmission). If XD0D1 “
TD0D1S where S is defined as in Eq. (10), then TAAA
and TAAB are both nonzero.
Proof. If TAAA is zero, then User 0 cannot recover file
A. So, TAAA is nonzero. We know that the entire file B is
not stored on any cache. If TAAB is zero, then every user
must be demanding only A. This reveals the demands of
all the users, so TAAB must be nonzero.
Note that Lemma 12 is only a necessary condition for
demand privacy.
C. Proof of Lemma 3
Let the coefficient matrix TAA “ pu, v, w, xq. From
Lemma 12, pu, vq ‰ 0 and pw, xq ‰ 0.
„
Ci
TAA

S “
»
– ai bi 0 00 0 ci di
u v w x
fi
fl
»
——–
A0
A1
B0
B1
fi
ffiffifl (31)
By Eq. (23b), we have
rk
ˆ„
ci di
w x
˙
“ 1
Both pci, diq and pw, xq are nonzero due to Lemma 8
and Lemma 12 respectively. Thus, both pw, xq and
pci, diq are scalar multiples of each other for i “ 0, 1.
This implies that pc0, d0q is a scalar multiple of pc1, d1q.
Then rk
ˆ„
ci di
TABB
˙
is same for i “ 0, 1. However,
this contradicts Lemma 11, by which
rk
ˆ„
c0 d0
TABB
˙
“ 1 and rk
ˆ„
c1 d1
TABB
˙
“ 2.
This shows the in-feasibility of coefficient matrices sat-
isfying the rank constraints due to recovery and demand
privacy.
Therefore, we conclude that a linear private
p2, 2; 1, 1{2q coded caching scheme with subpacketiza-
tion of two does not exist.
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APPENDIX B
IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS FOR UNCODED
PREFETCHING WITH THREE SUBFILES
In Appendix A, we have seen that with two subfiles
we cannot obtain a private p2, 2; 1, 1{2q scheme. Here we
show that without coded prefetching we cannot obtain
a private p2, 2; 1, 2{3q scheme with three subfiles and
thereby prove Lemma 4.
Informally, the proof is organized as follows. First, we
show that without coded prefetching the subfiles must
be cached in an uncoded form i.e. without linear com-
binations. This restricts the possibilities for the caches.
Furthermore any given cache restricts the possibilities for
the other user’s cache. Demand privacy is possible only
if the set of caches consistent with a user allow the recon-
struction of both the files for any demand. We show that
is not possible and hence a linear private p2, 2; 1, 2{3q
scheme with subpacketization of three subfiles does not
exist.
A. Permissible caches without coded prefetching
Without coded prefetching, the subfiles can only be
replicated in the cache. With three subfiles, M “ 1 im-
plies that each user can store 3 subfiles. R “ 2{3 implies
that there are two independent subfile combinations in
the transmission. If all the subfiles in a cache belongs
to a file, that user cannot recover the other file from a
transmission of rate R “ 2{3. So a cache should contain
two subfiles of one file and one subfile of the other file.
Let the two files be A and B. Without loss of generality,
let us assume the cache of first user, Z0 contains two
subfiles of file A and one subfile of B.
Z0 “ tA0, A1, B2u. (32)
Let the cache of User 1 be
Z1 “ tG0, G1, G2u, (33)
where Gi P tA0, A1, A2, B0, B1, B2u.
Lemma 13. If Z0 “ tA0, A1, B2u, then the permissible
cache for Z1 must be one of the following.
Z1 “ tG0, G1, A2 | G0, G1 P tB0, B1, B2uu (34a)
or Z1 “
"
G0, G1, A2
ˇˇˇ
ˇ G0 P tA0, A1uG1 P tB0, B1, B2u
*
. (34b)
.
Proof. Consider the transmission
XBA “
„
u
v

“ (35)„
α0A0 ` α1A1 ` α2A2 ` β0B0 ` β1B1 ` β2B2
γ0A0 ` γ1A1 ` γ2A2 ` δ0B0 ` δ1B1 ` δ2B2

User 0 can use its cache contents to eliminate three
variables from the system of linear equations in Eq. (35).
The reduced/equivalent equations for User 0 is„
u1
v1

“
„
α2A2 ` β0B0 ` β1B1
γ2A2 ` δ0B0 ` δ1B1

Since User 0 does not have access to A2, for recovering
B0 and B1 we need
rk
ˆ„
β0 β1
δ0 δ1
˙
“ 2 and
„
α2
γ2

“
„
0
0

(36)
The transmission XBA cannot involve A2. So A2 must
be in Z1 for it to recover file A from X
BA.
G2 “ A2
All the subfiles in Z1 cannot be that of file A. So, we
have two cases for the possible values of tG0, G1u based
on the associated files. Either both of them are subfiles
of B as in Eq. (34a) or one of them is subfile of A and
the other is of B as in Eq.(34b).
B. Two subfiles of file B in Z1
In this section, we will show that if the cache of User 1
is of the form given in Eq. (34a), then the scheme is not
private.
Lemma 14. If Z0 “ tA0, A1, B2u, and Z1 “
tG0, G1, A2u and Gi P tB0, B1, B2u, then demand
privacy is not satisfied.
Proof. Let G0, G1 P tB0, B1, B2u. The reduced equa-
tions corresponding to XBA for User 1 will be„
u2
v2

“
„
α0A0 ` α1A1 ` β0B0 ` β1B1 ` β2B2
γ0A0 ` γ1A1 ` δ0B0 ` δ1B1 ` δ2B2

(37)
For User 1 being able to obtain subfiles A0 and A1
from the transmission, we need
rk
ˆ„
α0 α1
γ0 γ1
˙
“ 2, and (38a)„
β2
δ2

“
„
0
0

(38b)
Due to Eq. (36), Z2 must contain the subfiles B0 and B1,
for eliminating those variables from XBA and recover
the subfiles of A.
tG0, G1u “ tB0, B1u (39)
Now consider the transmission for D “ pA,Aq.
XAA “
„
u
v

“ (40)„
α1
0
A0 ` α
1
1
A1 ` α
1
2
A2 ` β
1
0
B0 ` β
1
1
B1 ` β
1
2
B2
γ10A0 ` γ
1
1A1 ` γ
1
2A2 ` δ
1
0B0 ` δ
1
1B1 ` δ
1
2B2

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For User 1, reduced equations are„
u2
v2

“
„
α10A0 ` α
1
1A1 ` β
1
2B2
γ1
0
A0 ` γ
1
1
A1 ` δ
1
2
B2

(41)
For User 1 recovering A0 and A1, it requires
rk
ˆ„
α1
0
α1
1
γ10 γ
1
1
˙
“ 2 and (42a)„
β1
2
δ12

“
„
0
0

(42b)
For demand privacy we require the existence of some
cache Z 1
1
which can recover file B from XAA. Since
XAA doesn’t involve B2, it must be present in Z
1.
Z 11 “ tH0, B2, A2u
For no value of H0 P tB0, B1, A0, A1u, it can recover
both B0 and B1 (or file B completely) from X
AA due to
Eq. (42a). Thus, if Z0 has two subfiles of A, Z1 cannot
contain two subfiles of B as given in Eq. (34a).
C. Two subfiles of file A in Z1
If the cache of User 1 is of the form given in
Eq. (34b), then we can restrict the cache even further
as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 15. If Z0 “ tA0, A1, B2u, then the permissible
cache for Z1 must be of the form Z1 “ tG0, G1, A2u,
where G0, G1 are distinct and G0 P tA0, A1u and G1 P
tB0, B1u.
Proof. We need to show G1 ‰ B2. Since Z1 already
contains A2, it can have either A0 or A1, both of which
are in Z0. Without loss of generality, let G0 “ A1.
Assume G1 “ B2. Then Z1 “ tB2, A1, A2u Consider
the transmission
XAB “
„
u
v

“ (43)„
α0A0 ` α1A1 ` α2A2 ` β0B0 ` β1B1 ` β2B2
γ0A0 ` γ1A1 ` γ2A2 ` δ0B0 ` δ1B1 ` δ2B2

For User 0, these equations reduces to„
u1
v1

“
„
α2A2 ` β0B0 ` β1B1
γ2A2 ` δ0B0 ` δ1B1

(44)
Since User 0 have no access to B0 andB1, for recovering
A2, we need
rk
ˆ„
β0 β1
δ0 δ1
˙
ď 1 and (45a)„
α2
γ2

‰
„
0
0

(45b)
For User 1 the equations from XAB reduces to„
u2
v2

“
„
α0A0 ` β0B0 ` β1B1
γ0A0 ` δ0B0 ` δ1B1

(46)
For User 1 recovering B0 and B1, it requires
rk
ˆ„
β0 β1
δ0 δ1
˙
“ 2 and (47a)„
α0
γ0

“
„
0
0

(47b)
Equations (47a) and (45a) are contradictory, HenceG1 ‰
B2. So G1 P tB0, B1u.
By Lemma 15, there are four possible choices for Z1
as given below.
Za “ tA1, A2, B0u (48a)
Zb “ tA1, A2, B1u (48b)
Zc “ tA0, A2, B0u (48c)
Zd “ tA0, A2, B1u (48d)
Lemma 16. If Z0 “ tA0, A1, B2u and Z1 P
tZa, Zb, Zc, Zdu, then demand privacy is not possible.
Proof. It suffices to show demand privacy is not possible
for Z1 “ Za, since we can arrive at the other cache
combinations by relabeling.
Suppose the cache Za “ tA1, A2, B0u is assigned to
the User 1. Then, by arguments similar to Lemmas 13,14
and 15, the User 1 is aware that the cache of User 0 must
have two subfiles of A, with one being A0 and the subfile
of B in Z0 is not B0. The four possible caches for Z0
consistent with Z1 “ Za are given below.
Ze “ tA0, A1, B1u (49a)
Zf “ tA0, A1, B2u (49b)
Zg “ tA0, A2, B1u (49c)
Zh “ tA0, A2, B2u (49d)
Note that Z0 “ Zf . For demand privacy we need the
caches consistent with Z0 to be able to recover both
files and vice versa.
Consider the transmission
XAB “
„
u
v

“ (50)„
α0A0 ` α1A1 ` α2A2 ` β0B0 ` β1B1 ` β2B2
γ0A0 ` γ1A1 ` γ2A2 ` δ0B0 ` δ1B1 ` δ2B2

For the User 0 with cache Z0 “ tA0, A1, B2u the
transmission XAB reduces to the following set of equa-
tions after eliminating the subfiles which are already
present in Z0.„
u0
v0

“
„
α2A2 ` β0B0 ` β1B1
γ2A2 ` δ0B0 ` δ1B1

(51)
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For User 0 whose demand is A already has A0 and
A1. Only A2 needs to be recovered from X
AB. This
is possible only if the following conditions are satisfied.
rk
ˆ„
β0 β1
δ0 δ1
˙
ď 1 and (52a)„
α2
γ2

‰
„
0
0

(52b)
Similarly, for the User 1, whose cache is Z1 “ Za,
the transmission XAB reduces to„
u1
v1

“
„
α0A0 ` β1B1 ` β2B2
γ0A0 ` δ1B1 ` δ2B2

(53)
For User 1 to recover B0 and B1, the following condi-
tions must be satisfied.
rk
ˆ„
β1 β2
δ1 δ2
˙
“ 2 and (54a)„
α0
γ0

“
„
0
0

(54b)
The reduced equations for Zb are„
ub
vb

“
„
α0A0 ` β0B0 ` β2B2
γ0A0 ` δ0B0 ` δ2B2

(55)
The reduced equations for Zc are„
uc
vc

“
„
α1A1 ` β1B1 ` β2B2
γ1A1 ` δ1B1 ` δ2B2

(56)
The reduced equations for Zd “ Zg are„
ud
vd

“
„
α1A1 ` β0B0 ` β2B2
γ1A1 ` δ0B0 ` δ2B2

(57)
The reduced equations for Ze are„
ue
ve

“
„
α2A2 ` β0B0 ` β2B2
γ2A2 ` δ0B0 ` δ2B2

(58)
The reduced equations for Zh are
„
uh
vh

“
„
α1A1 ` β0B0 ` β1B1
γ1A1 ` δ0B0 ` δ1B1

(59)
From the above constraints and the reduced equations
for all users we can infer the following.
1) Due to Eq. (54b), Zb cannot recover file A since it
has no access to A0.
2) Due to Eq. (54a), and since Zc has no access to B1
and B2, it cannot cannot eliminate them from the
transmission to recover file A.
3) Due to Eq. (52b), Ze cannot recover file B.
4) Due to Eq. (52a), Zh cannot recover file B.
Hence, from the four possible caches for Z1, the only
cache that might be able to recover file A and might
achieve privacy for User 1 is Zd. But since there are
only five equations from the cache and transmissions,
it is impossible for Zd to recover all the six subfiles
A0, A1, A2, B0, B1, B2 and thus recover file B also.
That means, no possible cache for User 0 consistent with
Z1 is able to recover file B from X
AB. This results in
no demand privacy for User 0.
On the other hand, if XAB is such that Zd can recover
file B, then it results in no privacy for User 1.
Note that any consistent set of caches for User 0 and
User 1 can be obtained by permuting subfile labels of
file A and file B (permutation πA to relabel A and πB
to relabel B). Applying the same relabeling, the above
proof will hold true for them as well. This concludes the
proof of Lemma 4.
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